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American Council on Education v. FCC, 451 F.3d 226 (D.C. Cir.
2006).
Issue: Whether the Federal Communications Commission's ("FCC" or
"Commission") interpretation of the Communications Assistance for Law
Enforcement Act, 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010 ("CALEA" or "the Act"), ruling that providers of broadband Internet access and voice over Internet
protocol ("VoIP") services are regulable as "telecommunications carriers"
under the Act, was lawful.
Holding: The United States Court of Appeals found the FCC's interpretation to be lawful. It denied the petition for review, finding the arguments
brought forth by The American Council on Education, law enforcement
agencies, and other interested parties (collectively "ACE") unconvincing.
Specifically, the court rejected three arguments advanced by ACE. First,
ACE argued broadband Internet is an information service and is, therefore,
excluded from the reach of CALEA. Second, VolIP is an information service and also beyond the scope of CALEA. Third, the Commission unlawfully applied CALEA to private networks. Finding the Commission had
reasonably interpreted the Act, the court denied the petition for review.
Discussion: In 1994, in response to changing technologies, Congress
passed CALEA. The Act requires telecommunications carriers, but not
information services, to ensure their networks are capable of being accessed by law enforcement officials. However, the statutory language did
not make clear which services fell into each category.
CALEA defines a telecommunications carrier as "an entity engaged in
the transmission or switching of wire or electronic communications as a
common carrier for hire."1 Further, an entity is deemed a telecommunications carrier if "the Commission finds that such service is a replacement for
a substantial portion of the local telephone exchange service." 2 This "Substantial Replacement Provision" ("SRP") allows the FCC to include new
technologies that substantially replace the functions of the telephone network in the definition of telecommunications carrier. CALEA defines an
information service as "the offering of a capability for generating, acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making
available information via telecommunications. 3

§ 1001(8)(B)(ii).
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ACE, concerned their enforcement efforts were being compromised by
non-compliant providers, petitioned the FCC in 2004 to clarify the scope
and interpretation of CALEA. The FCC ruled that providers of broadband
Internet access and VolP services are telecommunications carriers under
the Act and, therefore, they must allow law enforcement to intercept communications transmitted over the providers' networks.
The FCC also ruled that the Act creates three categories of communications services: pure telecommunications (governed by CALEA); pure information (falling outside the scope of CALEA); and hybrid telecommunications-information services (partially governed by CALEA). Further, the
Commission ruled that broadband and VoIP are hybrid services, as they
contain both telecommunications and information components. Therefore,
CALEA applies to hybrid service providers to the extent that they qualify
as telecommunications carriers under the SRP. However, the Commission
also clarified that CALEA does not apply to private networks, insofar as
they meet one of the Act's exclusions. Finally, the Commission stated that
both CALEA and the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104104, 110 Stat. 56, 47 U.S.C. §§ 251-276 ("1996 Telecom Act") grant the
FCC the discretion to interpret Congress' ambiguous treatment of hybrid
telecommunications-information services.
In its review, the court used the two-step approach stated in Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. NaturalRes. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Chevron dictates that if the intent of Congress is made clear, the courts and
agencies must pay heed to that expressed intent. But, if the statute does not
fully express Congressional intent, the court must determine if the
agency's interpretation is "reasonable."
First, ACE argued broadband Internet access is an information service
and, therefore, not governed by CALEA. The FCC classified broadband as
an integrated information service under the Act, and ACE argued that this
same classification must apply to CALEA as well. The court disagreed
because the two are distinct statutes and the FCC can reasonably interpret
the two differently. Congress explicitly left an interpretive gap for the
agency to fill and the Commission had the authority to do so in a reasonable manner. The FCC's interpretation of CALEA was, indeed, a "reasonable policy choice." The 1996 Telecom Act was designed to regulate
commerce by wire and radio, while CALEA is a law enforcement mechanism. Because the two clearly have distinct purposes, the FCC can reasonably interpret the language of the statutes differently. Chevron does not
allow the FCC's reasonable interpretation to be set aside in favor of an
alternate, or even superior, possible interpretation.
Second, ACE argued the Commission arbitrarily and capriciously refused to classify VolP as either a telecommunications service or an information service. ACE did not suggest into which category VoIP should fall,
only that it must be categorized by the Commission. Again, the court disagreed, and quickly denied the claim. The FCC did, in fact, classify VolP
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providers as telecommunication carriers (not telecommunications services,
to which the 1996 Telecom Act does not speak), while specifically excluding the voice-transmission portions of VolP from the information services
classification. The court found ACE's claim had no merit, as VolP was
classified.
Third, ACE expressed its fears that the Commission would adopt a rule
allowing it to extend its regulatory authority throughout private networks.
Once again, the court dismissed the claim. To begin with, ACE unacceptably based its argument on a proposed rule and not a final rule. Additionally, challenges to possible future action by the FCC were not ripe for decision. If the fears came to pass, an aggrieved party could then bring forward
a petition for review.
ACE's arguments were all rejected and the petition for review denied.
The court upheld the lawfulness of the Commission's interpretation of
CALEA.
Summarized by Sarah Dwyer-Heidkamp
Covad Communications Co. v. FCC, 450 F.3d 528 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
Issue: Whether the Federal Communications Commission's ("FCC" or
"Commission") amendments of its unbundling determinations for three
types of unbundled network elements ("UNEs") - switches, transport
trunks, and local loops - were proper under the unbundling provisions of
the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (" 1996 Telecom Act").
Holding: The court found the Commission's amendments were proper
and denied all petitions for review.
Discussion: Under the 1996 Telecom Act, the Commission has broad
powers to choose what network elements should be unbundled. The FCC
must "consider, at a minimum, whether... the failure to provide access to
such network elements would impair the ability of the telecommunications
carrier seeking access to provide the services that it seeks to offer."' The
particular definition of "impair" has been a source of much litigation.
This case arose in response to a four-part order issued by the FCC. This
order was issued after receiving and considering comments regarding the
D.C. Circuit's USTA 11 decision. The four-part order provoked petitions
from both incumbent local exchange carriers ("ILECs") and competitive
local exchange carriers ("CLECs") for review of the Commission's unbundling determinations for three specific UNEs.
In its four-part order, the FCC explained that it would "find 'impairment'
where it would be 'uneconomic' for a 'reasonably efficient' CLEC to
compete without UNEs." After basing its impairment analysis on existing
and potential competition, the FCC identified two separate proxies for determining whether Dedicated Transport Facilities are competitive, focusing
1

47 U.S.C. § 251(d)(2).

COMMLAW CONSPECTUS

[Vol. 15

on the extent of fiber-based collection and business line density. It explained there is no impairment without access to DS1 transport links
"when both ends of the transport route terminate in 'Tier 1' wire centers."
It further explained there is no impairment without DS3 transport links
"where both ends of the route terminate in 'Tier 2' wire centers." Thirdly,
the FCC addressed DS 1 and DS3 loops. It determined there is no impairment in markets "where CLECs have deployed - or could economically
deploy - higher-capacity facilities that can be 'channelized' to provide
service at lower levels." Again, the FCC focused on fiber-based collocators
and business-line density. And finally, the FCC declared that unbundling
was no longer necessary for mass market local circuit switching (MMLS).
The two challenges raised by the ILECs were that the FCC did not consider the impact of TSASs in its unbundling analysis, and that it imposed
impossibly high thresholds for determining the level of competition in the
market for DS1/DS3 transport and loops. The three challenges raised by
the CLECs were that they are universally impaired without unbundled access to DS1 loops, DS3 loops, and DS1 transport. They further contend
they are universally impaired without access to MMLS. Finally, they argue
that the FCC's transitional rules are arbitrary and capricious.
Ultimately, the court denied all petitions for review, concluding "the
Commission's fourth try is a charm."
Summarized by Julie Mumm
EarthLink, Inc. v. FCC, 462 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
Issue: Whether the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") was
within its power pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 160(a) when it granted authority
to forbear the Bell Operating Companies ("BOCs") from supplying Earthlink, Inc. ("Earthlink"), a competing internet provider, "unbundled" access
to particular fiber-based network facilities.
Holding: The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia upheld
the FCC decision by denying review of Earthlink's petition, finding it
withstands a Chevron analysis for proper implementation of 47 U.S.C. §
160, is not arbitrary, and is substantially supported by the record. The court
concluded that in determining whether to refrain from unbundling, the
FCC was not required to make a detailed market analysis specifying geographic markets and types of services. Also, the court agreed that the FCC
may make its determination by considering future long term goals for telecommunications and potential market developments. Finally, the court
noted that the FCC acted reasonably and properly approached the issue by
showing that the beneficial short-term affects of forbearing unbundling
were out weighed by the beneficial long-term affects.
Discussion: Against the reality of local telephone company monopolies
in the 1990s, the Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("1996 Telecom Act")
was enacted to "promote competition and reduce regulation in order to
secure lower prices and higher quality services for American telecommu-
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nications consumers and encourage the rapid deployment of new telecommunications technology." Incorporated in the 1996 Telecom Act is a provision, 47 U.S.C. § 251, that grants the FCC "authority to require incumbent
local exchange carriers ("ILECs") to provide access to their network facilities and capabilities on an 'unbundled' basis to competitive local exchange
carriers ("CLECs")". Furthermore, the 1996 Telecom Act contains a provision, 47 U.S.C. § 271, designed particularly for BOCs that secures their
entrance into long distance markets normally off limits given antitrust concerns, so long as they comply with a "competitive checklist." Among other
various items in the checklist, BOCs must "provide unbundled access to
local loops, local transport, local switching, and call-related databases."
Despite the preceding provisions, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 160, the FCC
is required to refrain from acting upon a provision of the 1996 Telecom
Act regarding a "telecommunications carrier 'in any or some of
geographic markets,' if three conditions are met: (1) enforcement is
its ....
not necessary to ensure that charges and practices are just, reasonable and
non-discriminatory; (2) enforcement 'is not necessary for the protection of
consumers': and (3) forbearance 'is consistent with the public interest.'
The FCC has applied this provision previously to forbear "unbundling" as
it relates to fiber broadband network elements including certain fiber-tothe-home loops and "the next generation network, packetized capabilities"
of hybrid loops and "packet-switching." Furthermore, following USTA H
in which the Court was persuaded by FCC analysis of the costs of unbundling, namely "investment disincentives," versus the "benefits of removing
this barrier to competition," unbundling was not required for fiber-to-thecurb loops and loops to multi-dwelling homes.
In the instant case, the FCC based its analysis on § 706 which promotes
the operation of broadband services. Application of the three-part test under § 160 directed the FCC's conclusion that the short-term affects of unbundling on competition are out weighed by the potential increase in intermodal as well as ILEC and CLEC competition. Such competition will in
turn promote reasonable rates, benefit consumers and serve the public interest.
In its petition, Earthlink challenged the FCC action with three separate
arguments. First, Earthlink argued that the FCC improperly applied § 160.
Specifically, Earthlink contended that the forbearance may be granted only
so long as the FCC conducts a "'painstaking analysis of market conditions'
in 'particular geographic markets and for specific telecommunications services"' and that the FCC may not grant forbearance "with an eye to the
future." The court disagreed with Earthlink by applying the Chevron
analysis, namely, (1) if the statute "unambiguously" answers the issue at
hand further consideration is unnecessary; and (2) where the FCC is
granted authority to address statutory ambiguity the court will defer to its
interpretation even in face of a more reasonable explanation. Because §
160 is silent as to the future perspectives and § 706 informs the FCC that
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forbearance is to be used to "encourage the deployment on a reasonable
and timely basis of advanced telecommunications capability to all Americans, the court found the FCC's "forward-looking approach" appropriately
interpreted.
Second, Earthlink argued that the FCC action "arbitrarily assessed
broadband competition in an irrational and ad hoc manner." Earthlink contends that the FCC analysis should have been guided by considering particular products, geographic markets and established market analysis involving supply and demand and elasticity. On this issue the court's discretion is limited. It need only guarantee the FCC was thorough and that the
action was rationally related to the facts such that it is supported by substantial evidence or the FCC has not obviously acted in error. In light of
this standard, the court disagreed with Earthlink, finding the FCC's consideration of the particular circumstances by balancing the future and shortterm affects satisfactory.
Finally, the court concluded forbearance was consistent with the record.
The court noted in particular that Earthlink's precedent was not directly
applicable to the present claim. Notably, the court found that the cases
cited by Earthlink either pertained to dominant carrier regulation not at
issue or favored the FCC's practice in granting forbearance. Furthermore,
since the court agreed with the FCC's "forward-looking approach" there
was sufficient support from the record showing that unbundling is outweighed by longer-term benefits of forbearance.
For the foregoing reasons, the court denied Eathlink's petition for review.
Summarized by Lindsay Capodilupo

